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NOTES AND COMMENTS
legitimate and spurious, and add a new and substantial hazard to
the many already confronting the manufacturer. As to the first
of these objections the danger nght be minnized by a policy of
scrutinizing a plaintiff's case with a dubious eye and requiring clear
proof of a material breach of warranty 40 As to the latter objection,
each manufacturer could protect hnself to a large extent by
inspecting carefully and advertising cautiously 41
It is submitted that the Washington court reached a desirable
result, and one that is consistent both with common law principles
and with modern business practice. J. B. SnomiEy.
DISmmuTIoi OF EXTRAORDINARY DIvIDENDs TUDEM A TRUST.
The distribution of extraordinary dividends between the life
tenant and the remainderman under a trust created in corporate
stock is a problem which has been extremely vexing to the courts
with the result that three general rules have been developed. But,
regardless of the rule followed, it is universally agreed that the
intentions of the testator or trustor should be controlling.' The
extraordinary dividend is most likely to arise under one of the
following circumstances
1. Where an unusually large dividend is paid out of
profits accumulated over a period of years.
2. In cases of total or part liquidation of the business
and a distribution of the funds arising from the sale of
the assets or of the business as a going concern.
Capital stock, unlike other property which may be the corpus
of the trust, is possessed of a threefold value- par, market, and book
value.! The stock is evidence of the stockholders' interest in the
corporation. Hence, par value, which is merely that printed on
the stock certificate, is clearly no evidence of the true interest
which the owner may have, since the net worth of the company
rules calculated to prevent fraud; to protebt persons who are necessarily
ignorant of the qualities of a commodity they purchase; and to make it
the interest of manufacturers and those who sell, to furnish the best
article that can be supplied." (5 Bing. 533, 543). And again: "The case is
of great importance; because it will teach manufacturers that they must
not aim at underselling each other by producing goods of inferior quality,
and that the law will protect purchasers who are necessarily ignorant of
the commodity sold." (5 Bing. 533, 546).
"1 The construction placed upon the wording of the advertisement gives
the court an opportunity to exercise its discretion. See for examples of
rather strict construction the cases of Newhal v. Word Haking Co. and
Alpzne v. Frzend Bros., Inc., cited in note 6 supra.
"But there is always the danger that a chance defect will result in
liability, as in the instant case. It is somewhat ironical that the Ford
Motor Co., which has the reputation of being a very conservative adver-
tiser, should be the defendant in this action. Yet the hazard is not as
great as this case might lead one to believe, since the measure of damages
in most cases would be but the price of the defective article.
'Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549; 34 L. ed. 525, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1057
1890) Carter v. Crehore, 12 Raw. 309 (1900) Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md.
549, 28 Atl. 565, 44 Am. St. Rep. 310 (1894) Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N.
H. 201, 66 Atl. 124, 12 L. R. A. (n. s.) 768 (1907) Irvinng v. Houstoun, 4
Paton Sc. App. 521 (1803) Bouck v. Sproule, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 385 (1887).
'KESrs, Accounting Theory and Practice (1925 Ed.), Vol. II, 398.
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may have increased or decreased, due to accumulated profits or
losses. The market value, which is that placed on the stock in the
market, depends principally on the present and prospective divi-
dend producing capacity of the stock and may be affected by many
collateral facts and opinions of investors. The book value is
determined by taking the total assets less the total liabilities and
dividing the difference, which is the net worth, by the number of
shares of stock outstanding. Therefore, it is the only one which
gives any consideration to the value of the corporation and, conse-
quently, it is the only value which will truly represent the stock-
holders' interest. This, then, is the value at which the corpus
should be appraised.
Assume a trust was created in corporate stock on March 1, 1932,
the income to be paid to C for life and the stock to go to D or his
heirs on the death of C. Suppose the company had not declared
dividends since 1919, but had retained the profits in the business
for the purpose of expansion. If the company declared a stock
or cash dividend on December 31, 1925, what would be the result
under each of the general rules?
Under the Massachusetts rule all cash dividends, however large,
belong to the life tenant and all stock dividends belong to the re-
mainderman.3 Applying the rule to the suppositious case, the
dividend would go to the remainderman if stock, and to the life
tenant it it were cash. Since the dividend represented profits
earned between the years of 1919 and 1925, the result would be to
give to the remainderman profits earned after the creation of the
trust, which rightly belong to the cestut que trust. If the dividend
were cash the effect would be to reduce the book value of the stock,
because assets are withdrawn from the corporation. Hence, insofar
as this dividend reduced the book value below the figure as of the
3 Minot v. Pane, 99 Mass. 101 (1868). But a survey of subsequent Mas-
sachusetts cases reveals that the court does not apply the rule blindly
but looks to the substance of the matter. See Darland v. Williams, 101
Mass. 571 (1869) holding a cash dividend with privilege of taking stock,
was held merely done to comply with the law and the company intended
capitalizing the earnings, belonged to the remainderman. Leland v.
Hayden, 102 Mass. 542 (1869). Treasury stock purchased on the open
market with earnings was held to be income. Heard v. Eldridge, 105 Mass.
258 (1872) holding a cash dividend paid out of proceeds of sale of real
estate taken by eminent domain was a distribution of capital and be-
longed to the remainderman. Dams v. Jackson, 152 Mass. 58, 25 N. E. 21
(1890) Cash dividend with right to take out new stock or retain the cash,
held that the cash dividend belonged to life tenant and proceeds from
the sale of the stock rights belonged to the remainderman. The present
tendency is to allow a more liberal treatment of the life tenant. Gray v.
Hemenway, 212 Mass. 239" 98 N. E. 789 (1912) Boston Safe Dep. & Trust
Co. v. Adams, 219 Mass. 175, 106 N. E. 590 (1914) The English rule es-
tablished in Brander v. Brander 4 Yes. 800 (1799) and adopted by the
House of Lords in Irvng v. Houstoun, 4 Paton Sc. App. 521 (1803) but
slightly modified and limited by Bouch v. Sproule, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 385
(1887) is practically the same as the Massachusetts rule. While the U.
S. Supreme Court follows the Massachusetts rule it is interesting to
note that Mr. Justice Gray who had previously been a member of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, wrote the opinion. Gibbons v.
Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, L. ed. 525, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1057 (1890)
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date of the creation of the trust, it would result in a distribution
of the corpus to the life tenant.
The Kentucky rule4 would give the dividend to the life tenant re-
gardless of whether it was stock or cash, simply because the trust
was in existence at the time the dividend was declared. Such a
disposition of the profits being distributed would give the life
tenant a part of the trust res. It is an elementary principle of
trusts that the intent of the trustor control.' Therefore, inasmuch
as the Kentucky and Massachusetts rules distribute corpus to the
life tenant or income to the remainderman, they cannot be sup-
ported on recognized principles.
The Pennsylvania rule, sometimes referred to as the American
rule, treats stock and cash dividends alike, and apportions the
dividend according to the time when the profits were earned by the
corporation. By its application the life tenant would be entitled
to share in the dividend to the extent that the book value of the
stock as of the date of creation of the trust was not impaired.6
Beyond that point the cash or stock dividend would be held to be-
long to the remainderman. The result is that the corpus of the
trust is maintained intact, the life tenant has received the income,
and the expressed intentions of the trustor have been effected.
In situations involving liquidating dividends a survey of the
cases shows that the courts which apply the apportionment rule
refuse to consider the book value controlling, and give the entire
dividend to the remamderman on the ground that it represents a
distribution of the trust res.! In cases of a sale of the property at
a profit the remamderman is held to be entitled to the entire divi-
dend. The argument used to justify giving any increase in value
of the assets to the remainderman is that, since he must bear any
losses, he should be entitled to the increased value of the corpora-
tion's assets. It may also be explained on the theory of an analogy
with a trust created in land. But where the trust res is realty it
is the intent of the trustor that the remainderman take the land
' Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 253, 20 S. W 778, 19 L. R. A. 173, 40 Am. St. 189(1892) Cox. 'v. Baulbert's Trustees, 148 Ky. 409, 147 S. W 225 (1912).
Kentucky is the only jurisdiction following this rule. For a thorough re-
view of the early New York cases, which probably followed the Kentucky
rule, see In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723, 50 L. R. A. (n.s.) 510(1913), in which the court expressly adopted the Pennsylvania rule of
apportionment.
See note 1 supra.0Earps Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368 (1857) Holbroolk v. Holbrook, 74 N. H.
201, 6 At. 124, 12 L. R. A. (n.s.) 768 (1907) Lord v. Brooks, 52 N. H.
72 (1872) In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723, 50 L. R. A. (n.s.)
510 (1913) Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927) Jones
v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 140 Atl. 862 (1928) Re Oliver's Estate,
136 Pa. 43, 9 L. R. A. 421, 20 Am. St. Rep. 894 (1890). See 77 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 981, 23 Col. L. Rev. 569.
"Gifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass. 478 (1874) Second Universalist
Church v. Colegrove, 74 Conn. 79, 49 Atl. 902 (1901) Wheeler v. Perry,
18 N. H. 307 (1846) Re Stevens, 111 App. Div. 773, 98 N. Y. S. 28 (1906)
Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 Fed. 501 (1904) Connoly's Estate, 98 Pa. 137,
47 Atl. 1125 (1901) Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. St. 145, 34 Atl. 577 (1896)
Walker v. Walker 68 N. H. 407, 39 AtI. 432 (1896) Re Skillman, 2 Con-
noly 161, 9 N. Y. S. 469 (1890) Vintom's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434, 44 Am. Rep.
116 (1882).
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in fee, and, therefore, to hold that the remarnderman realizes on
the increase in value of the land is merely giving effect to the in-
tent of the trustor.
It may be admitted that the book value test does not take into
consideration intangibles which are not shown on the books. Good-
will is a striking example. Conservative accounting and finance
requires that goodwill be included on the balance sheet or carried
on the books only at such times as it has been realized on and the
value actually determined. But problems of intangible values will
only arise when the business has been sold as a going concern. At
that time the goodwill has been given a definite value. This value
may be added to the net worth and the sum divided by the number
of outstanding shares of stock, thus defimtely establishing a value
for the trust res. The fact that the remainderman may sustain
some loss should not be controlling. He is a donee at the most
and the possibility that a loss in value of the corpus may result is
a circumstance over which no control may be exercised. It is, there-
fore, submitted that the book value test should be followed in cases
of liquidating dividends as well as cases involving a distribution
of accumulated profits.
The Massachusetts and Kentucky rules were adopted at an early
period when accounting systems had not developed to the extent
they are today The common practice of the corporations today is
to keep a complete accounting record and to take statements from
the books at regular intervals. The book value may be determined
from the balance sheet, hence the difficulty of application of the
Pennsylvania rule which may once have existed has been elimin-
ated. Jurisdictions following the Massachusetts rule have rejected
the Pennsylvania rule solely on the ground of difficulty of ap-
plication.8
What is meant by "income" 9 Mr. Kester, in his book Account-
ing Theory and Practice Vol. I., in classifying income says "Other
sources of income are (1) the sale of assets other than stock in
trade, such as securities, machinery, land, etc., for more than the
values at which they appear in the records." If such is the mean-
ing of the word in business circles, are we not forced to conclude
that the same meaning was intended by the trustor I
The application of the Pennsylvania rule to cases involving
liquidating dividends would not, because of modern accounting
practice of business organizations, present greater difficulties than
in situations involving the distribution of accumulated surplus
derived from the operation of the business. It would give full
effect to the intentions of the trustor. Therefore, it would seem
that this rule should be applied in all cases of extraordinary divi-
dends, regardless of whether the dividends were derived from op-
eration or liquidation of the corporation.
The question of the distribution of extraordinary dividends is
still an open one in Washington. In the case of Bothwell, Trustee
v. Estep et al ', the court set forth the various rules but was not
s See notes 3 and 4, supra.
9 James Bothwell as Trustee, Pl. v. Ezra Estep, et al., App., The Girls
Club of Seattle, et al., Resp., 166 Wash. 420, 6 P (2d) 1108 (1932).
RECENT CASES
compelled to adopt any one, since they found the dividend involved
a distribution of the corpus. The facts of the case show that the
fund for distribution arose through the sale of a subsidiary of the
company in whose stock a trust had been created. The branch was
sold as a going business and any amount realized over and above
the net worth may rightly be considered as goodwill. If the court
had applied the book value test the same result would have been
reached. The opinion quotes at length from Holbrook v. Holbrook,0
the leading case on the Pennsylvania rule. If the extensive quo-
tations are indications of the court's inclination, it may be assumed
that, when the question is squarely presented, Washington will
adopt the only reasonable and fair rule, the Pennsylvana rule,
which has the support of reason and the numerical weight of
authority R. W MAxwiL.
RECENT CASES
M.ASTER AND SERVANT - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - RIGHT TO SuE FOR
MALPRAcTicE OF PHYsIcIAN. The interesting question of an employee's
right of action against a physician for malpractice suffered in the treat-
ment of injuries received in the course of his employment, when the em-
ployment is covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act is discussed in
the recent case of Williams v. Dale, - Ore - 8 P. (2d) 578 (1932). There
the workman received final compensation from the Industrial Commission
over a year after the original accident. The injury in the meantime had
been aggravated by the malpractice of the attending physician, but no
report of the malpractice was at any time made to the commission. A
majority of a department of the Oregon Supreme Court held that the
final award must have completely covered the workman's situation as of
that time and therefore must have compensated him both for the main
injury and for any aggravation; that therefore the workman could not
sue the physician and in effect recover double damages. One judge,
dissenting, felt, because the malpractice was not reported to the commis-
sion, that the workman had not actually been paid for it and that this
action should lie.
The rule seems well established that a workman may recover compen-
sation for an aggravation of the original injury which is due to malprac-
tice. This was true at common law, Hunt v. Boston Terminal Co., 212
Mass. 99, 98 N. E. 786, 48 L. R. A. (n. s.) 116 (1912) and is the law under
the Workmen's Compensation Acts, in most jurisdictions. Yarrough v.
Hines, 112 Wash. 310, 192 P. 886 (1920) 8 A. L R. 503; 39 A. L. R.1276.
The contrary rule is less frequent. Ruth v. Witherspoon-Englar Co., 98
Kan. 179, 157 P. 403, .L. R. A. 1916E, 1201 (1916) Smith v. Golden State
Hospital, 111 Cal. App. 667, 296 P 127 (1931) and cf. Viita v. Fleming,
132 Minn. 128, 155 N. W 1077, L. R. A. 1916D, 644 (1916).
But whether the workman may himself sue the physician for the
malpractice is a disputed and variously determined controversy on which
the cases are not at all in accord. The general trend of the courts in
interpreting the various statutes seems to allow the workman an election.
He may either look to the Industrial Commission for an award covering
both injury and aggravation, or he may ask for compensation for the
original accident only, retaining a separate remedy against the attending
physician for the damages resulting from the latter's malpractice. Powlak
v. Hays, 162 Wis. 503, 156 N. W 464, L. R. A. 1917A, 392 (1916) Lakeside
Bridge & Steel Co. v. Pugh, 206 Wis. 62, 238 N. W 872 (1931) and see
Polucha v. Landes, 60 N. D. 159, 233 N. W 264 (1930).
Assuming this choice of remedies, a question arises as to the manner
in which it should be exercised. Must the workman make his election
clearly and unequivocally, or may he do so impliedly? In the principal
case, Williams v. Dale, supra, mere failure to report the aggravation to
the commission was not considered an election to sue the physician; there
"See note 1, supra.
